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BOOK NOTES
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
by Alessandra Luini del Russo (Lerner Law Book
Co., Inc., 1971).

Until the Nuremburg Tribunal, international thought
concerning human rights conformed to the idea that the
guarantor of these rights was the national sovereign. With
the birth of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the need for international guarantees of
human rights within a state was formally recognized; that
individuals have certain inalienable human rights is a
proposition which few nations will dispute today. Furthermore,
despite wide ideological differences, most states have found
it possible to agree on the scope and consequences of man's
fundamental freedoms. However, at the point of agreeing on
the mechanisms by which remedies may be made available to
those individuals whose rights have been infringed, international accord generally breaks down. It is this problem
of arriving at a practical international guarantee of human
freedoms which Professor del Russo investigates in a comprehensive survey and analysis of the European Convention's
machinery for effective international protection of human
rights, as well as the history preceding this agreement
between seventeen European nations.
The history of international concern for human rights
and of the attempts to secure those rights on an international
basis is a brief one, but it is built on a centuries-old
search for human freedom. Professor del Russo examines the
origins of man's belief in fundamental human freedoms and
traces the development of that belief to the point where it
was recognized that this subject was one of international
concern. In the shambles of post-war Europe and at the
conference in San Francisco, the international community
acknowledged its belief that world peace was not possible
without the assurance of personal freedoms to the citizens
of all nations. Shortly thereafter, however, the newly
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organized United Nations demonstrated the practical inability
of the member nations to arrive at a workable system of
guarantees. Political and idelogical differences were too
great for the achievement of the utopian goal of global protection of human rights. It is against this backdrop of
theoretical agreement and practical disunity that Professor
del Russo portrays the European Convention as an example of
effective protection and as a solution leading to eventual
world-wide agreement.
In recognizing the inadequacy of the United Nations for
these purposes, the European Convention of 1950 adopted a
European Bill of Rights embodied in the Convention and
subsequent Protocols. Three agencies were set up to provide
a means for enforcing the enumerated rights: the European
Commission, the Court of Human Rights, and the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe. The main portion of the
book deals with each of these organs separately, considering
their jurisprudence, their jurisdiction and procedure, and
their significance to the signatory nations. Focusing on the
main problem, the previous inability of states to cooperate
in such a venture, Professor del Russo gives careful attention
to the strategems and procedures adopted for the functioning
of each organ. It is this aspect of the book which makes it
not merely a survey of the Convention, but rather a clear
demonstration of the workability of the European Convention.

The European Commission and its self-adopted rules are
representative of the framers' concern that the structure of
guarantees they might achieve would be enforceable only by
consent of the member nations. Although the Convention
revolved around the idea of a judicial remedy for alleged
violations of human rights, several states had voiced
objections to the idea of compulsory jurisdiction. For
instance, it was by no means certain that the jurisdiction
of the Court of Human Rights would be accepted by all or
even some of the member states. The Commission served as
a means of briding the gap of five years between the
Convention and the eventual acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction largely because its own self-imposed rules
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acted to calm the fears of nations which mistrusted the idea
of the Court. These rules of procedure demonstrate the
Commission's concern for providing sufficient safeguards to
respondent states to permit the building of a gradual
acceptance of the Commission and its jurisdiction. With this
in mind, the Commission provides for initial review of all
petitions in secret. The succeeding steps are a blend of
conciliatory and fact-finding procedures. As a result of
these factors most disputes are settled without being referred
to the Committee of Ministers or to the Court of Human Rights.
The secrecy of the Commission's procedures has been criticized
as incompatible with its function of protecting human rights,
but, as the author points out, any other approach would never
have gained the wide support which the Commission now enjoys.
The Committee of Ministers and the Court of Human Rights
are the alternatives which the Commission has for the final
disposition of those petitions which it rules admissible and
which have not yet been settled by informal arrangement. It
is only through one of these bodies that reparation can be
granted a petitioner. This judicial role of the Committee of
Ministers is another result of the desire to provide redress,
even at the cost of leaving the decision-making process to a
highly political body instead of a judicial institution. It
was created as an alternative for those signatory states who
refused to accept the Court's jurisdiction. Thus a judicial
aspect was added to the Committee's executive powers in the
hope that it would be an interim measure until the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction was accepted by all signatory states.
In addition, the Committee like the Commission, has secret
hearings in deference to the sensitivities of states. Of
the three institutions, only the Court of Human Rights has
open hearings and public records.
The Court represents the final result of pitting compromise and pragmatism against the fears and hesitation of the
member states in submitting themselves to such compulsory
jurisdiction. The Convention makes no mention of the independence of the judiciary or of the finality of its decrees;
it merely provides for a Court with the same number of
Justices as there are member nations in the Council of Europe.
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Furthermore, there is no mention of conflicts or interests
on the part of the Justices. The single requirement is they
be of high moral standards. Finally, an individual petitioner
has no standing before the Court. The Court's jurisdiction
is not original over all human rights disputes, rather, it is
derivative from the Commission. Thus, at first glance, it
would seem that the conciliation of the states has eroded the
original concept of the Court's power at the expense of the
object of the entire Convention: namely, the individual.
But as Professor del Russo's treatment of the problem shows,
this is not the case. In actual practice, because the Court's
jurisdiction has been accepted by many of the member nations,
the individual still has a remedy and a hearing.
There is a close working relationship between the
Commission and the Court. When a case is forwarded by the
Commission, it then acts as amicus curiae as well as the chief
fact-finding instrument to the Court. The Court has the power
to call as a witness any person deemed important to the controversy, including the original petitioner. In this way the
rights of the individual are in fact protected in an open
hearing, while the dignity of the party-state is preserved to
its satisfaction. An examination of this procedure is pursued
further by the author's analysis of the seven cases which the
Court had adjudicated at the time of printing.
The feature of the book which is perhaps most convincing
of the efficacy of the Convention is the survey in Chapter IX
of the impact of the Convention at the national level. The
most striking examples of the Convention's effectiveness are
to be found in those states which do not recognize the
Convention as law. In those instances, the Convention can be
seen as creating a moral framework within which every state
feels compelled to legislate and adjudicate. As to those
states which accept the Convention as domestic law, the
impact is even more pronounced and more certain. For instance,
Malta, the last country to ratify the Convention, has adopted
verbatim large portions of the provisions of the Convention in
its Constitution. The author concludes this survey of the
Convention's effectiveness with an analysis of the future of
the European model in other settings. Emphasis is again
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placed on the pragmatic attitudes of the member states which
have been the foundation of the success of the European
Convention.
Professor del Russo's book should prove invaluable as
a reference for those interested in a concise overview of
the workings of the European Convention, as well as for those
interested in the practical problems of protecting human
rights on the international level. It is well organized for
the purposes of either group, and includes appendices containing selections from the major international agreements
and declarations on human rights, including the Universal
Declaration, the European Convention, and the Inter-American
Convention. While the author examines only the European
Convention in detail, its general applicability on a wider
scale or in different areas is strongly suggested. Further
consideration of the relationships between the various
signatory nations prior to the Convention might have been
desirable as a framework within which to view the Convention.
This is because the European states have had a far longer
history of cooperation on a limited basis than any other
comparable group of nations. The success of the Convention
is undoubtedly based to some extent on this fact, and detailed
knowledge of the impact of this factor is a prerequisite to
any final determination of the Convention's wider application.

C.H.H.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA
by Juraj Andrassy (Columbia Univ. Press, 1970)

International Law and the Resources of the Sea
constitutes an addition to the growing body of literature
dealing with the utilization of the ocean floor by nations.
The book is concerned with the development of the continental shelf as a legal concept. In essence, it seeks to
recast this geological expression into an international
legal term dealing with property rights on the ocean floor.
The author first examines the scientific meaning of
"continental shelf" and provides a survey of the phrase as
it presently is used in treaties and agreements, including
a proposal for a new legal definition of the term. The
latter chapters of the book deal with the problem of administering undersea land to which no claim has been made.
The author introduces the book with a discussion of the
continental shelf, i.e. that area between the shoreline or
shallows and the ocean depths. This region is directly
related to the submarine terrain and the geological activity
of the area. The size of the continental shelf, therefore,
varies substantially within the borders of any given state.
Between states, there is even greater variation.
The legal difficulty with the geological concept becomes
evident when consideration is given to the growing importance
of the ocean floor as an economic and political asset.
Originally it was conceived that the physical properties of
the location would constitute the major bar to unlimited
territorial claims to the ocean bottom. The limitations of
pressure and depth, it was reasoned, would prevent expansion
by nations across these undersea territories. Such limitations
have been eliminated by scientific developments, resulting in
claims to undersea lands by countries with adequate technology.
The author suggests, consequently, that the demands of some
countries for increasingly larger shares of this area will
continue unless some boundary is created to confine the
expansion. As man is able to work at greater depths and
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pressures for longer periods of time, there would be little
to prevent the United States, for example, from claiming a
portion of the ocean floor reaching 1,500 miles into the
Atlantic. Alternatively, those countries without sufficient
technology or wealth would be unable to make any effective
claim to the undersea territory. Furthermore, completely
landlocked countries would not be in a position to participate
in the great undersea land boom.
The author suggests that the geological concept of the
continental shelf is inadequate for a legal resolution of the
problem. Since there are neither human nor geographical
limitations to potential expansion the author selects an
artifical limitation consisting of-two elements: depth and
distance. He contends that the most practical limit would
allow expansion in the submarine lands either to a depth of
200 meters (isobaths) or for a distance of 30 miles from low
tide shoreline, whichever secures a greater area for the
sovereign.
One critical consideration of the plan is the arbitrary
nature of its limits. From those limits, disputes will
inevitably arise. Those countries which have relatively
small claims to contiguous submerged areas presumably would
not protest the wider boundaries. On the other hand, nations
which fall within the following three categories can be
expected to oppose strongly the author's plan: first, nations
with extant technology capable of immediately expanding undersea claims; second, countries which are currently overpopulated;
and third, underdeveloped countries with limited natural
resources. The first situation is exemplified by the United
States or the Soviet Union, which have increasingly turned to
the ocean floor for both economic and strategic reasons.
Neither country would be amenable to limiting their expanding
claims which have resulted from advanced technology. The
second case is illustrated by countries such as India or
Communist China where dry land continuously is being depleted.
The magnitude of the population and the concomitant demand on
land and resources force these nations to turn to undersea
territory. The third category is illustrated by several
Latin American claims currently extending as far as 200 miles
into the ocean. These countries have limited assets and feel
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that the utilization of undersea resources should be
reserved to themselves.
In the second part of the book, Professor Andrassy
deals with the administration of that area of submerged
lands not in the hands of a particular country. He contends that even if a limit of either 200 isobaths or 30
miles is put into effect, there will be a substantial
area of the ocean floor unclaimed by any sovereign. The
plan, therefore, is to divide the undersea areas of the
world among nations according to need. It is this area,
the author indicates, that will solve the problem of
countries, such as the Congo or Switzerland, which have
no contiguous undersea area.
This divided area would require administration by an
international body. The author envisions a tiered organization consisting of a board or council, a director or
secretary-general, and an assembly having open membership.
The assembly would be the general policy making body.
Professor Andrassy does not, however, go beyond these
general guidelines in establishing the functions and duties
of the assembly. It may be inferred from the argument for
open membership that the assembly tier is to serve as a
channel for communication and intercourse through which
nations, not represented on the council or board, may
express their desires and participate in the formulation
of policy. In emergency situations, however, the efficacy
of such a large assembly would be minimal. As a result,
the author emphasizes the role of the other two tiers in
facilitating the policy making function of the organization.
First, the board or council would have a selective membership and would be charged with the general administrative
functions of the agency. Second, the director or secretarygeneral presumably would be given general supervisory duties.
The author views these two tiers as being essentially the
decision-making organs. He gives several examples of how
these tiers might be structured, but does not advocate any
particular method of implementation. Because of the author's
unwillingness to expand his ideas, it is difficult to determine how useful or effective these organs will, in fact, be.
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In his treatment of unclaimed undersea territory, the
author avoids extensive treatment of the functions and
scope of the agency which he proposes. In broad terms he
does suggest, however, that the agency will provide research
work and services such as weather forecasting; regulate all
uses of the sea; grant licenses and control submarine
exploration; and generate improved undersea agreements. The
key to the entire scheme is the ability of the proposed
organization to regulate the area with the necessary precision. For this reason, an analysis of the day-to-day
operation of the agency would be an asset to the book. The
ultimate test of the agency's success will be the regulation
and control of this vast area of land, unhindered by the
national claims. Because Professor Andrassy is silent about
this aspect of his plan, one is forced to conjecture about
the scope of the agency's powers and its chances of success
in the administration of this great frontier.

K.D.K.
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